This concerns cases where certain
facts, though relevant to the fact in issue cannot be proved, because their
admission is prohibited on the ground of public policy, as being prejudicial to
the security of the state or because they infringe the privacy of an individual
or on the ground that it is desirable that litigation should end as quickly as
possible. Such facts are said to be privileged.
Where a witness is competent and
compellable to give evidence and is entitled to claim privilege either for
himself or the person he is representing; when he does so, he may be entitled
to refuse to give evidence or produce document on matters relevant to the issue
before the court. The privilege in most is that of the witness and not that of
the party to the action, except in the case of communication with Legal
Practitioner/Adviser; in which the privilege belongs to the party. A party not
himself protected by privilege cannot avail himself of it.
Privilege is of two main types,
namely:
(a)
Official
communication of records of state matters which is referred to as state
privilege; and
(b) Private privilege; that is communication
between private persons.
State Privilege
The reason for state privilege is
that a revelation of such matters will endanger the security of the state or
the good administration of public affairs or justice. State privilege is
covered by sections 190, 191, 242 and 243 of the Evidence Act 2011.
Section 190(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 provides that subject to any direction of the President
in any particular case, or of the Governor of Evidence as to affairs a State
where the records are in the custody of a State, no one shall be permitted to
produce any unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, or to
give any evidence derived from such record except with the permission of the
officer at the head of the Ministry, Department or Agency concerned who shall
give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit:
Provided that the head of the
Ministry, Department or Agency concerned shall, on the order of the court,
produce to the judge the official record in question or, as the case may be,
permit evidence derived from it to be given to the judge alone in chambers; and
if the judge after careful consideration shall decide that the record or the
oral evidence, as the case may be should be received as evidence in the
proceeding, he shall order this to be done in private as provided in section 36(4) of the Constitution.
Further, section 191 of the Evidence Act 2011, provides that no public
officer shall be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official
confidence, when he considers that the public interests would suffer by the
disclosure: provided that the public officer concerned shall, on the order of
the court, disclose to the judge alone in chambers the substance of the
communication in question; and if the judge is satisfied that the communication
should be received in evidence this shall be done in private in accordance with
section 36(4) of the Constitution.
However, by section 242 of the Evidence Act, 2011,
(1)
A
witness, subject to the provisions of section 243 of this Act, summoned to
produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to
court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to
it admissibility and the validity of any such objection shall be decided by the
court.
(2)
The
court, if it deems it fit, may inspect the document or take other evidence to
enable it to determine on its admissibility.
(3)
If
for such a purpose, it is necessary to cause any document to be translated, the
court may if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret,
unless the document is to be given in evidence and if the translator disobeys
such direction, he shall be held to have committed on offence under subsection
(1) of section 97 of the Criminal Code.
In other words the court has the
power to inspect such evidence in order to determine whether to disclose it or
not. Section 243 provides the
procedure on how to deal with such documents. Under that section, if the Minister
or Commissioner objects to the disclosure before trial, the procedure will be
to file an affidavit; but if the objection is during trial, it shall be by a
certificate.
It was hitherto believed that
affidavit or certificate by the Minister or the Scheduled Officer is
conclusive. This submission was held untenable in lieu of the constitutional
provision protecting the interest of citizens. In Maja & Sons Ltd. v. UAC
Nig. Ltd (1971)1 NWLR 157, the Lagos High Court held that the affidavit
or certificate referred to under section 220 (now section 243) is not
conclusive to take the matter out of court’s jurisdiction. The court stated
that even if the matters mentioned there is prima
facie privilege; it is for the court as an impartial arbiter to determine
whether the stated public interest outweighs a person constitutional right to
fair hearing: Conway v Rinmer
(1968) AC 901; (1968) ALL ER 870 contrasted and distinguished.
Although, the court has power to deny
the conclusiveness of the executive affidavit or certificate as to state
privilege; there are certain cases however, where the executive is better
equipped to assess what is the public interest rather than the court. Facts
such minutes of cabinet meetings, communication within the executive arm and
between the executive and ambassadors overseas and matter relating to defence
can hardly be ordered to be produced by the court.
Section 36(4) & (6) of the CFRN, 1999 (as
amended) provides that the proceedings of any court shall be held in public
provided that if in any proceedings before a court or such a tribunal, a
minister of the government of the Federation or a minister of the Government of
a state certifies that it would not be in the public interest for any matter to
be publicly disclosed, the court or tribunal shall make arrangement for
evidence relating to that mater to be hard in private and shall take such other
action as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the disclosure of the
matter.
In the case of African Press Ltd and Anor v
AG. Western Nigeria (1965) NSCC 10, the Attomey General of Western Nigeria claimed privilege
under section 220 (now section 243) of the Evidence Act when asked by the
defence to produce certain official files in a trial for sedition. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Apex court commented on the Attorney General’s refusal
thus.
It remains the duty of the court to uphold the right
to a fair trial, and if in a criminal case there are reasonable grounds for
supposing that the exclusion of evidence by such a certificate might prejudice
the accused in making his defence, the court is bound to say that the
prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The minister is
made the judge of what is the public interest required, but he must weigh one
consideration against other, and he should be reminded that it is always
contrary to one facet of the public interest if relevant evidence is excluded.
The relevant evidence is for the court, not the minister to decide.
But, in Maja’s Case supra, the court referred to the English case of Conway v. Rimmer (supra) in which
the house of Lords, considering the same issue with regard to state privilege,
held that the courts have power to order production of a state document and to
overrule a minister’s decision to withhold it on ground of privilege if such a
course is dominantly necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice. The
reason for the foregoing principle is to avoid injustice which might result
especially in criminal proceedings where citizen is prevented from putting up a
good defence.
Judicial Privilege
By section 188 of the Evidence
Act 2011, no Justice, Judge, Grand Kadi or President of a Customary Court of
Appeal and, except upon the special order of the High Court of the State,
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or Federal High Court, no Magistrate, or other
persons before whom a proceeding is being held shall be compelled to answer any
questions as to his own conduct in court in any of the capacities specified in
this section, or as to anything which came to his knowledge in court in such
capacity but he may be examined as to other matters which occurred in his presence
whilst he was so acting.
Again, by section 189 of the Evidence Act, 2011, no Magistrate, Police Officer or any
other public officer authorised to investigate or prosecute offences under any
written law shall be compelled to disclose the source of any information as to
the commission of an offence which he is so authorised to investigate or
prosecute and no public officer employed in or about the business of any branch
of the public revenue, shall be compelled to disclose the source of any
information as to the commission of any offence against the public revenue. Part
II of the Fifth Schedule of the 1999 constitution defines a public officer or
who is a public officer.
By virtue of this rule, the name of
the informant or of the person to whom the information was given, or the nature
of the information or any other question as to the channel of its communication
or what was done under it are protected from disclosure in evidence: R v. Hardy. But the production of the sources of information may be
allowed if require to established innocence in criminal cases: Rogers v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1973) AC 388 @ 407.
Private Privilege
This type of privilege particularly
concerns professional Communications with legal advisers. By section 192(1) of the Evidence Act 2011,
No legal practitioner shall at any time be permitted unless with his clients
express consent, to disclose any communication made to him in the course and
for the purpose of his employment as such legal practitioner by or on behalf of
his client or to state the clients or condition of any document with which he
has become acquainted in the course of and for the purpose of his professional
employment, or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course of
and for the purpose of such employment.
Therefore, no legal practitioner is
permitted disclose any communication made to him in the cause of his client or
any other person on his clients behalf, unless the client expressly or
impliedly waive that privilege. There are two exceptions to this rule. The
first is under section 192(1)(a)
which has to with any communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose
even though it is made under the circumstance stated in section 192(1). Judicial authority for this proposition can be
found in R v. Cox & Rayttoe (1884)
14 QBD 153, where the solicitor was compelled to disclose what passed between
the defendant and himself when the defendant consulted him with a reference to
drawing up a Bill of sale which was allege to fraudulent.
The second exception can be found in section 192(1)(b) which is to the effect
that, any fact observed by a legal practitioner in the curse of his employment
as such, showing that any claim or fraud has been committed since the
commencement of his employment could be disclosed. The old English case of Brown v. Foster, where a barrister was
held to be able to testify whether a particular entry book belonging to his
client which he saw during his trial, in a subsequent proceeding had been falsified
is instructive in this regard.
Additionally, the client is not
deemed to have waived the privilege by giving evidence in his case; but if he
calls the legal practitioner as a witness in that same suit, the client is
deemed to have waived the privilege, only if he questions the practitioner on
maters which but for such questions are privilege: section 194 of the Evidence Act 2011.
The legal practitioner also must not
disclose any advice he may have given to the client in the course and purpose
of such employment: Alfred Crumpton Amusement
Machines Ltd v. Customs and Excise Commission (No.2) (1972) All ER 353.
This type of the privilege, it must be noted apples only between lawyer/client relationships
and not to other professional client relationships and it does not cease because
the client relationship has ceased: section
192(3) thereof. By section 193 of the Evidence Act 2011, the
provisions of section 192 shall apply to interpreters and the clerks of legal
practitioners.
Lastly, section
195 of the Evidence Act 2011, provides that no one shall be compelled to disclose to the court any
confidential communication which has taken place between him and a legal
practitioner consulted by him, unless he offers himself as witness in which
case he may be compelled to disclose any such communications as may appear to
the court necessary to be known, in order to explain any evidence which he has
given, but not others.
Privilege against Self-Incrimination
By section 183 of the Evidence Act
2011, no one is bound to answer any question if the answer thereto would, in
the opinion of the court, have a tendency to expose the witness or the wife or
husband of the witness to any criminal charge, or any penalty or forfeiture
which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred or sued for. Hence
this privilege protects a witness from being compelled to answer a question
capable of incriminating him or rendering him liable to a penalty or
forfeiture.
The scope of this privilege is
limited to protection from exposure to any of the three liabilities, viz, to a prosecution for a crime,
payment of penalty or recovery of forfeiture. This privilege does not entitle
the person to refuse to go into the witness box to testify. It has nothing to
do with his competence or compellability. This is what is known as the rule in Blunt v. Parklane Hotel Ltd (1942)
2 All ER 187 @ 189, judgment of Goddard J.
Again, on the authority of Boyle v Wiseman, a witness cannot
refuse to go into box on the ground that he might incriminate himself, he can
only clam this privilege after he has been sworn and the incriminating
questions are asked him.
Also, it is the duty of the courts to
ascertain whether the answers to the question will expose the witness or spouse
of the witness to a criminal charge, forfeiture or penalty. If the question is
one who will obviously call for an incriminating answer, the court will always
rule in favour of the privilege against self incrimination. However, if the
court is of the view that the answer will not incriminate the witness or the spouse,
the court may decide to investigate the matter further in order to ascertain
whether the answer to such questions will incriminate the witness or his or her
spouse.
But, if the answer given by the
witness has a remote possibility that the witness or spouse will be exposed to
a criminal charge or reveal a minor offence or the offence that was committed a
very long time ago, the court will refuse the privilege and ask the witness to
answer the question. Anything the witness is forced to say after he had taken
the privilege will be taken as involuntary and not according to his will and
this will nullify the case on appeal.
Similarly, if the privilege reveals
the penalty to be suffered only at customary law, the court will refuse the
privilege and ask the witness to answer the question. Please note that an
accused giving testimony cannot claim this privilege. Also, if it shows that
the suffering is a civil suit, the court will not rule in favour of the
privilege. Lastly, there is no privilege for a witness who is giving evidence
under section 458 of the Criminal Procedure Act in an inquiry directed by the
Attorney-General.
Admissions Made Without Prejudice
The law by virtue of section 196 of the Evidence Act 2011 is that a statement in any
document marked "without prejudice" made in the course of negotiations
for a settlement of a dispute out of court, shall not be given in evidence in
any suit. The privilege under this heading thus arises only in civil cases.
These are admissions of fact made
either orally or in a letter without
prejudice to any subsequent or pending action and on the express or implied
understanding that evidence of them should not be given at the trial of such
actions. When the admissions are made under these circumstances, the court will
not allow evidence of them to be given; they are thus privileged from
disclosure and inadmissible. A good example of this kind of admissions is
contract negation letters.
The reason for the principle is because: it is the
policy of the law that dispute should be amicably settled if possible and it
would be unwise to enter into negotiations if statements made during such
negotiations were admissible in evidence at the trial in the event of the
attempt to settle not being successful. This is the opinion of per Lush J in La Roche v. Armstrong (1922) 1 KB 485.© Onyekachi Duru Esq and www.legalemperors.com, 2016. (All Rights Reserved) Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this site’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Onyekachi Duru Esq and www.legalemperors.com with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.